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The Just World Fallacy as a Challenge to the Business-As-Community Thesis
Matthew Sinnicks
ABSTRACT:  The  notion  that  business  organizations  are  akin  to  Aristotelian  political
communities  has  been a central  feature of  research into virtue ethics  in  business.  In  this
article, I begin by outlining this “community thesis” and go on to argue that psychological
research into the “just world fallacy” presents it with a significant challenge. The just world
fallacy undermines our ability to implement an Aristotelian conception of justice, to each as
he or  she is  due,  and imperils  the relational  equality  required for shared participation in
communities. In the final section, I offer a description of what Aristotelian community might
look like within organizations, and some suggestions about how it may be possible to resist
the challenge posed by the just world fallacy.
INTRODUCTION
Since its renaissance in the second half of the 20th century, virtue ethics, and in particular
Aristotelian  virtue  ethics,  has  been taken up with  some enthusiasm by business  ethicists
(Cowton, 2008), and is now perhaps as common a focus in the business ethics literature as
any other ethical theory. One feature of this voluminous scholarship is the notion that modern
business organizations are analogous to the Polis, the ancient Greek city-state, and can be
regarded as Aristotelian communities. I refer to this as the “community thesis.” Community
too has become an important topic in recent scholarship, across a variety of disciplines. A
number of scholars have argued that “community” has been eroded in contemporary society
with increasing levels of social fragmentation, individualism, normlessness, uncertainty, and
anxiety (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 2007; Putnam, 1998; Sennett, 1998,
2006).  The  notion  that  community  can  occur,  and  indeed  be  fostered,  in  business
organizations  is  therefore  worthy  of  further  investigation,  and  in  this  article,  I  outline  a
challenge to those who accept the community thesis.
Another central facet of contemporary virtue ethics is the interest its proponents, in the spirit
of Aristotle himself, have shown in empirical work relevant to ethics and moral philosophy
(for a good selection, see Sinnott-Armstrong & Miller, 2017). However, one notable strand of
such research in psychology which has received little attention from Aristotelians, or indeed
ethicists of any stripe, is the “just world fallacy,” which can be defined as the phenomenon of
people mistakenly believing fortuitous patterns of reward or harm to be in some way just. The
main aim of this article is to outline the consequences this fallacy has for the community
thesis.
I begin by outlining Aristotelian business ethics and the view that we can understand business
organizations  as  forms  of  Aristotelian  political  community  advanced  by  Solomon (1992,
1993), Sison and Fontrodona (2012, 2013), Hartman (2015), and many others. I then move on
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to outline the just world fallacy, and the challenge this fallacy presents to the notion that
business organizations can be understood as Aristotelian communities. This challenge results
from the fact that the just world fallacy undermines our ability to implement an Aristotelian
conception of justice, to each as he or she is due, and imperils the kinds of relationships
required for shared participation in communities, relationships which must be between parties
who are, in some sense, equals, and so not undermined by an undue deference or an undue
disregard.
This does not render the notion of business organizations as communities unattractive as a
normative ideal, instead it shows just how difficult an ideal it is to realize. Nevertheless, in
the final section, I offer a description of what Aristotelian community might look like within
organizations, and some suggestions about how it may be possible to resist the challenge
posed by the just world fallacy. I do so by highlighting four features I take to be conducive to
the  existence  of  genuine  community:  a  suspicion  of  inequality, few displays  of  unequal
power, an emphasis  on face-to-face interaction,  and relatively equal  pay. While  I  remain
skeptical about the viability of the community thesis in light of the challenge posed by the
just  world fallacy, these suggestions seem to me to give organizations the best chance of
establishing a genuine sense of community, and avoiding the ethically deleterious effects of
individuals  tending to  mistakenly  believe  that  fortuitous  patterns  of  reward are  based on
merit.
ARISTOTELIAN BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE “COMMUNITY THESIS”
According  to  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  understood  in  broad  terms  to  include  Neo-
Aristotelians, Thomists, as well as some Marxists,1 ethics is fundamentally concerned with
the pursuit of flourishing. Virtues—settled states of character that dispose us to act well—are
at once conducive to, and partially constitutive of, that flourishing. Unlike deontological and
consequentialist  accounts  of  ethics,  Aristotelian  virtue  ethics  does  not  primarily  aim  to
identify rules and principles to govern conduct, but focuses rather on broader questions about
how we are to live. According to Aristotle, ethics cannot be fully captured by any system of
rules (Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 2000, hereafter referred to as NE, 1094b). This is not
to  say  that  ethics  is  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  moral  rules,  which  Aristotle
recognized as being important, but rather that rules are never sufficient for morality. Virtuous
action always requires sound judgment on the part of the virtuous agent.
The virtues themselves are always a mean between extremes of excess and deficiency, and
are acquired partly through a process of active habituation. For example, temperance is a
mean between self-indulgence and an insensibility to pleasure, and we become temperate by
acting temperately. On the path to virtue we may need to steel ourselves against temptations,
and perform virtuous actions unhappily, but when virtue is fully acquired, the acts that follow
from it are done willingly, and chosen for their own sake (NE 1105a). The highest human
end, according to Aristotle,  is  rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (NE
1097b).
1 A point emphasized by scholars such as Meikle (1997), Pike (1999), and Knight (2007). It  is possible to
include  many  other  philosophers  under  the  broad  heading  of  Aristotelianism,  including  even  Adorno,  if
Freyenhagen (2015) and Reeves (2016) are correct.
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The process of virtue acquisition, and indeed the pursuit of flourishing, is not a matter for
isolated  individuals.  Aristotle  held  that  politics  is  a  continuation,  and  in  some ways  the
culmination, of ethics. He argues that the state is prior to the individual, and is the whole of
which the individual is a part (Aristotle’s Politics, 1998, hereafter referred to as Pol, 1253a).
As individuals, we can only achieve our ultimate goal of flourishing within the Polis, a kind
of association we are fitted to by nature. As Aristotle says, “among all men there is a natural
impulse towards this kind of association” (Pol 1252b). Human beings are, by nature, political
animals, and our good can only be sought within a political community. A community in this
Aristotelian sense is not simply a haphazard assemblage of individuals, but rather “a unified
body of individuals; people with common interests . . . with common characteristics or beliefs
. . . a group organized around common values” (Melé, 2012, p. 92). It is this sense of shared
values that allows Aristotle to claim that the good of a Polis is the flourishing of its citizens.
Citizens were not passive recipients of the benefits the state provided—they had to contribute
to  the  state  and  were  directly  involved  in  governing.  For  Aristotle,  foreigners,  slaves,
children, and women were not true citizens of the Polis, only those entitled to participate in
the state’s deliberative and legislative processes were (Pol 1275b). Participation in the life of
the community was required for full membership of the state.
Aristotle was not an egalitarian in a distributional sense. He held that a desire for this kind of
equality was a cause of disharmony that was common to city-states of his time (Pol 1301b)
and thought it proper for honors to be unequally awarded in line with the uneven distribution
of  virtue  among  people.  However,  he  did  worry  that  victorious  parties  in  such conflicts
wielded power without regard to equality (Pol 1296b), and he did hold that the freemen of the
city-state, those eligible for citizenship, were each other’s equals in an important sense, even
if they possessed differing degrees of wealth and influence, and he did hold that the best kind
of  friendship  could  only  exist  between  equals  (see  Kraut,  2006).  Politics  deals  with  the
conditions in which the virtuous deliberate together about how to pursue their flourishing,
secure  in  the  knowledge that  no-one’s flourishing  can  be  pursued  outside  the  Polis.  For
Aristotle  then,  a  kind  of  relational,  rather  than  distributional,  equality  is  important  for
friendship  and  for  political  communities,  despite  his  suspicion  that  people  capable  of
adequately partaking in these facets of the best life were rare. Aristotle thought society should
be class-based and hierarchical because he assumed only a small elite were capable of being
true citizens, but true citizens shared the same fundamental status as such, and so could relate
to each other as equal participants in the life of the community.
The  concept  of  “relational  equality”  is  typically  associated  with  liberalism,  broadly, and
democratic egalitarianism, in particular  (see Anderson,  1999),  rather than Aristotelianism.
However, this is largely because Aristotelian political thought, more commonly associated
with communitarianism, makes greater, and morally richer, demands of the participants in a
political community (i.e., that they are engaged in meaningfully co-operating, collaborating,
and  directly  participating  in  community  affairs),  not  because  this  minimal  conception  of
relational  equality  is  unimportant.  While  differences  in  status  may  remain,  there  is  an
important  sense  in  which  community  members  relate  to  each  other  in  a  way  that  is
unstructured by such differences. In this sense, relational equality is associated with the ideal
of equal citizenship in terms of rights and duties, which is an ideal that unites liberals and
communitarian critics of liberalism (Taylor, 1994; Walzer, 1983). Indeed, if sharing the same
fundamental status and relating to fellow citizens as equals is an ideal appropriate to liberal
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democracy, it is at least required by the more ethically rich conception of citizenship in the
Polis.  Insofar  as  contemporary  Aristotelianism  seeks  to  reject  Aristotle’s  own  social
prejudices while retaining his insights, it is able to recognize that the ability to participate
meaningfully in a community is less rare than Aristotle supposed. Just as the Aristotelian goes
beyond the basic relational equality of liberalism in terms of what it asks of members of the
community, one theme of this article, which we will come to below, is that we need to go
further still in challenging Aristotle’s own acceptance of inequality.
Even if we can simply ignore some of the more unpalatable features of Aristotle’s thought,
there are others that pose problems for contemporary Aristotelians. One example of such a
problem is the fact that it is not easy to accommodate an understanding of business as an
ethical  endeavor  within  Aristotle’s  political  theory.  Aristotle  himself  was  hostile  to
commercial pursuits, which he regarded as being incompatible with flourishing. This position
seems to be much more deeply entrenched in “Aristotelianism” than Aristotle’s own low
opinion of women and foreigners, or his acceptance of slavery. Indeed, he regarded profit-
seeking activity as a kind of perversion. Each craft has its own distinctive purpose, and so to
engage in any craft with the accrual of wealth as the main motivation is to fail to give due
attention to that purpose. So, although he recognized trade as being necessary, if perhaps the
sort of thing a noble person would have as little to do with as possible, Aristotle was entirely
opposed to activities which focused on profit-making as an end in itself. As such, he would
have had a low opinion of the majority of business organizations in capitalist society. Indeed,
far  from  being  virtuous,  business  activity  would,  on  Aristotle’s  view,  be  primarily
characterized  by  the  vice  of  pleonexia.  “Pleonexia,”  sometimes  translated  as  “avarice,”
denotes both an “excessive desire to get more” and “violates canons of distributive fairness”
within communities (Balot, 2001, p. 33).
Nevertheless,  a  number  of  business  ethicists  have  been  inspired  by  Aristotle,  and  the
Aristotelian tradition more generally, and have taken up his focus on the political community,
suggested that business organizations can be understood as examples of such communities,
and highlight the ethically salient features of community membership within the business
organization.
According to Solomon, “[c]orporations are real communities, neither ideal nor idealized, and
therefore the perfect place to start understanding the nature of the virtues” (Solomon, 1992, p.
325). In these communities, relationships are more than mere contractual associations, and
“consist, first of all, in a shared sense of belonging, a shared sense of mission or, at least, a
shared sense of mutual interest” (Solomon, 1994, p. 277). Furthermore, “[i]f the corporation
is to be a good community, it must be an all-embracing community” (Solomon, 1994, p. 285),
which  suggests  that  all  members  of  the  community  are  held  in  esteem.  Here  we  see
Solomon’s commitment  to  a  version  of  the  relational  equality  present  in  Aristotle’s own
thinking about the Polis. Though it is unstated, one presumes that those who advance the
community  thesis  intend  ordinary  organizational  members  to  be  considered  citizens,  not
slaves.
The Aristotelian thread of Solomon’s account of business ethics runs deep enough for him to
accept  the  notion  that  our  good  and  that  of  our  business  community  cannot  be  entirely
separated. “What is best in us—our virtues—are in turn defined by that larger community,
and there is therefore no ultimate split or antagonism between individual self-interest and the
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greater public good” (Solomon, 2004, pp. 1022-1023), a sentiment which applies both to the
relationship between individual and business and to the relationship between business and
wider society itself. Solomon highlights the centrality of relationships within the community:
“What is worth defending in business is the sense of virtue that stresses cooperative joint
effort  and  concern  for  consumers  and  colleagues  alike”  (Solomon,  2004,  p.  1025).  As
Solomon says,
It takes no leap of faith to move from the actual cultures of most corporations to the recognition
that these are cooperative communities . . . and that mutual respect, caring and compassion is
what we all in fact expect and demand in our various jobs and positions. (Solomon 1998, p.
531)
In addition to the emphasis on mutual  respect,  this  sense of  compassion,  “feeling with,”
highlights  the  way  in  which  Aristotelian  communities  go  beyond  the  basic  relationships
required  for  membership  of  liberal  democratic  societies.  Each  member’s participation  is
important, on Solomon’s (1993) view: “what drives a corporation . . . is the collective will . . .
of its employees” (p. 150).
Some business  ethicists  in  the Aristotelian tradition have even conceived of  the business
community not  simply as  providing a  site  of cooperation,  but  as being conducive to  the
achievement of our deepest virtuous aspirations. Dobson (2008) claims that “the modern firm
is  an  institutional  form capable  of  supporting  a  valid  utopian  ideal”  (p.  67).  Sison  and
Fontrodona (2013) claim that “the common good of the firm is the collaborative work that
allows human beings not only to produce goods and services . . . but more importantly, to
develop technical or artistic skills and intellectual and moral virtues” and that each “worker is
an  actual  part  of  the  common  good  of  the  firm  because  everyone  makes  a  meaningful
difference to the whole” (p. 614). Sison and Fontrodona (2012) also note that they accept
Aristotle’s perspective on “sharing a good life in common, with family, friends and fellow-
citizens in the polis . . . The common good results from the joint deliberation, decision and
action of citizens” (p. 214).  At the very least,  this suggests that everyone is  worthy of a
hearing and everyone deserves to be part of the process of deliberation. Indeed, according to
Sison and Fontrodona (2012),  corporate  governance needs to be “decided on by a firm’s
members  through  joint  deliberation  or  dialogue”  (p.  233).  Here,  again,  we  can  see  the
importance of avoiding undue deference or disregard, which may hinder this deliberation and
dialogue.
On this understanding of business organizations, the element of shared endeavor, and perhaps
even  moral  growth,  is  as  central  to  business  as  the  focus  on  profit.  If  profit-seeking  is
regarded as but one feature of many, then even if Aristotle’s harsh pronouncements on the
ethics of profit-seeking are correct, they will not necessarily be decisive in a discussion of
business ethics. Indeed, business ethics can be recast as a branch of political philosophy, and
the profit motive a necessary constraint and limitation to organizations’ ability to facilitate the
good life for their citizens.
This conception of business ethics in terms of Aristotle’s account of political communities
has  noteworthy  implications.  For  instance,  it  opposes  accounts  which  focus  mainly  on
compliance  with  ethical  rules,  or  on  maximizing  shareholder  value,  promoting  good
consequences (perhaps in terms of Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives), and so on.
While advocates of the community thesis may be happy to accept all of these as being worthy
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aims, they will  be additionally  concerned with the relationships  between members of the
community,  and  concerned  to  ensure  that  all  members  are  able  to  be  fully  functioning
participants in that community. Melé highlights the importance of decision making in this
participation:  “a  person  within  a  community  participates  together  with  others  in  the
realization of the common activity. But participation also means taking part in the community
or in the decision making on matters which affect one’s own life” (Melé, 2012, p. 98). Melé
(2012) also claims that  “Community is  made up of  relations  or  feelings  with a  sense of
‘fellowship’” (p. 92), and that “when we affirm that a firm is a community of persons, we
emphasize  both  individuals  and  the  whole,  making  explicit  the  .  .  .  openness  to  self-
realization of each one who forms the community” (Melé, 2012, p. 97). In this sense, each
member is on equal standing with others with respect to their desert of self-realization.
According  to  Bragues  (2006),  “[t]he  corporations  that  now  fill  our  economic  landscape
provide a much bigger array of leadership opportunities than was the case in Aristotle’s time,
in  which  a  high  place  in  government  offered  the  only  opportunity  to  oversee  large
associations”  (p.  354).  This  suggests  Aristotle’s political  philosophy applies  especially  to
business ethics, and echoes Solomon’s suggestion that business organizations are the “perfect
place” to begin an enquiry into virtue. However, even if we agree that business organizations
present such an opportunity, it does not mean that businesses are always communities just as
city-states might fall short, on Aristotle’s view, if they are somehow deformed and do not
contribute to the human good, do not permit the requisite form of participation, and so on.
The enthusiasm of defenders of the community thesis notwithstanding, we may wish to offer
more modest claims about the possibility of community in business organizations. Indeed,
others have been careful to offer more restricted, normative claims.
O’Toole (2008) claims that in the Aristotelian workplace “all employees participate in the
decisions that affect their work” (p. 198), though he is not optimistic that such workplaces
can ever be widespread. Hartman has written much of interest on Aristotelianism in business
ethics  (see,  for  instance,  Hartman,  1998,  2011,  2013a,  2013b).  On the  topic  of  business
organizations as communities he says,
Aristotle would approve of our focus on the organization . . . Today, when organizations seem
to  be  overtaking  nation  states  as  the  primary  form  of  association  and  identification,  and
corporate  culture  is  such  a  powerful  determinant  of  behavior,  he  might  well  say  that  the
culmination of ethics is organization theory. He might well say, too, that good corporations
mold good people. (Hartman, 2008, p. 261)
While Hartman (2015) is clear that he wants to “suggest what virtue in business looks like,
and argue that it is possible, not that it is probable” (p. 20), the notion that Aristotle would
approve of  a  focus  on the  organization  is  presumably  because  the  prospects  of  business
organizations functioning as genuine communities is real. For the culmination of ethics to be
organization theory, then organizations must provide us with what we need to live flourishing
lives, namely a community within which to pursue this flourishing. At the very least we seem
to be talking about a real possibility, rather than an abstract possibility, or something merely
conceivable.
The claim that business organizations are communities is  not  limited to Aristotelians.  As
Néron (2010) points out, many business ethicists of all stripes have sought to understand
6
businesses as political communities, for instance work in the Kantian tradition (Bowie, 2017),
and CSR scholarship (Freeman & Liedtka, 1991; Heckscher & Adler, 2007).
It is likely, therefore, that the challenge I will go on to outline in the following section applies
to a broader array of positions than I focus on here. However, I focus on Aristotelian business
ethics both for the sake of concision, and because it is the position to which the challenge
most  readily applies,  given the prominent  place afforded to  the community thesis  within
Aristotelian  business  ethics.  Ultimately,  I  will  conclude  by  offering  a  heavily  qualified
endorsement  of  Hartman’s normative version of the community thesis  and by suggesting
some ways in which workplace community may be achieved, but in what follows I aim to
show that any feasible endorsement of the community thesis must be extremely challenging
to mainstream Aristotelian accounts of business ethics.
JUST WORLD FALLACY
Over  the  past  few  decades,  there  has  been  much  philosophical  interest  in  empirical
psychology, in particular in cognitive biases and the results of personality psychology. Here I
outline the just world fallacy and some of its consequences. This phenomenon is sometimes
termed “belief in a just world,” but I use “fallacy” to highlight the ethically salient reasoning
error at its core. While some ethical studies have used a belief in a just world as a variable,
for instance Ashkanasy, Windsor, and Treviño (2006), for the most part, ethicists have not
attempted to explore the ramifications of the just world fallacy, a variety of what Nisbett and
Ross (1991) term “the fundamental attribution error.” Unlike situationist critiques of virtue
ethics, which hold that situational factors shape our moral behavior to such an extent that
explanations in  terms of character  and the virtues  is  unconvincing (see Doris,  2002, and
Harman, 2003 for outlines of the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, and Webber, 2006,
and Alzola,  2008, 2012 for responses),  I  do not  claim that  Aristotelian business  ethicists
commit the just world fallacy. Rather, I claim that the fact that people are prone to make such
errors  can  be  problematic  for  those  business  ethicists  because  they  undermine  the
psychological  plausibility  of  the  community  thesis.  While  the  evidence  used  to  support
situationism, like the Milgram experiment, seems to show that people “are capable of beastly
behavior in circumstances where their practiced virtues are forced to confront an unusual
situation in which unpracticed efforts are required” (Solomon, 2003, p. 53), the evidence
supporting the just world fallacy seems to suggest that our evaluations of others are liable to
be determined by luck or chance, and are thus liable to undermine our ability to participate in
Aristotelian communities. It goes well beyond the scope of this article to explore all of its
ramifications. However, I believe it presents an obstacle for the community thesis as I shall
now seek to demonstrate.
The concept of the just world fallacy emerged as a result of research which showed that when
confronted with (ostensible) examples of injustice, experimental participants tended to show
disdain for innocent victims and admiration for the undeservedly successful. Indeed, research
has suggested that when confronted with broader, societal injustice, participants tend to adopt
belief systems that serve to justify existing economic and political arrangements (Jost, Banaji,
& Nosek, 2004). In other words, whatever the cause of any particular pattern of reward or
punishment, participants display a tendency to regard the outcome as being reflective of a just
allocation, even when that is patently not the case.
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In his original 1965 study, Lerner found that experimental subjects who were told that a
fellow student had won a cash prize in a random draw were inclined to  believe that the
student  worked  harder  than  another  student  who  had  not  won  the  prize.  The  outcome,
resulting  from  brute  luck,  led  participants  to  draw  the  unwarranted  conclusion  that  the
fortunate  student  had  done  something  to  deserve  it.  This  “reinterpretation  of  fortuitous
rewards,” as Bénabou and Tirole (2006, p. 705) put it, suggests that those who enjoy rewards
of some kind—power, prestige, money, for example—are automatically regarded as being
deserving of those goods, and thus our ability to put their merits into question is undermined.
Another study conducted by Lerner and Simmons (1966) revealed darker implications of the
fallacy. In  this  study, participants  were  confronted  with  an  “innocent  victim”—a woman
participating in a paired-associate learning task who was punished for making mistakes by
being  administered  seemingly  painful  electric  shocks.  When  led  to  believe  that  the
experiment would continue in the same fashion, the participants “chose to devalue and reject
the victim” (Lerner & Simmons, 1966, p. 209), with participants more likely to reject the
victim when they perceived the harm done to them was more severe. By contrast, when they
were told that the victim would be compensated for the pain caused by the electric shocks by
being paid for  each correct  answer, participants  stopped showing this  disdain.  Nearly all
participants who were given the choice between the two opted to give compensation rather
than administer the electric shock. However, the mere act of deciding to award the victim
compensation did not prevent participants from attributing fault to the victim. It was only
when they were certain that the victim would be compensated rather than shocked that the
negative evaluations of the victim ceased.
Thus, even in cases where the moral arbitrariness of the outcome is, in some sense, visible to
the  participants,  the  tendency  to  incorrectly  apportion  praise  and  blame  remains.  With
otherwise identical cases, the “successful” were regarded by participants as being deserving
of their success and the “unsuccessful” were regarded as being deserving of their failure.
Other research in the field has shown participants inclined to blame AIDS victims (Anderson,
1992; Comby, Devos, & Deschamps, 1995; Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2001), victims of assault
(Hammock & Richardson, 1993), victims of spousal abuse (Schuller, Smith, & Olson, 1994),
as well as to praise beneficiaries of gambling gains (Schmitt et al., 1991). This phenomenon
of victim blaming resulting from the just world fallacy will prove to be challenging for the
community thesis, and for the kinds of relationships that thesis presupposes.2
Research into the just world fallacy suggests we are both prone to be blind to true desert, and
even  when  we in  some sense  recognize  that  an  outcome is  unjust  we are  still  prone  to
attribute  some  degree  of  personal  fault  to  the  victim  as  if  the  outcome  was  simply
recompense for that  fault.  While  its  degree varies  between individuals  (Rubin & Peplau,
1975), and over a third of participants in Lerner and Simmons’ (1966) study did not derogate
the unlucky victim, the propensity to commit the just world fallacy has “been shown to be
stable and cross-culturally generalizable” (Furnham, 2003, p. 795).
Lerner’s  (1965,  1980)  explanation  of  this  phenomenon,  known  as  the  “just  world
hypothesis,” holds that people have a deep need to regard the world as being fundamentally
just, and committing the just world fallacy allows this belief to be retained even in the face of
apparently decisive counterexamples. As Lerner and Miller (1978) put it,  “The just world
2 For other examples, see Hafer and Begue (2005).
8
hypothesis is easily stated: Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where
people generally get what they deserve” (p. 1050). Indeed, according to Lerner and Simmons
(1966), “most people cannot afford, for the sake of their own sanity, to believe in a world
governed by a schedule of random reinforcements” (p. 203). To say that people commit the
just world fallacy for the sake of their sanity may be hyperbolic, but it seems that the best
explanation of the existence of the fallacy is that there is a kind of psychological pressure
exerted  by  apparently  inexplicable  patterns  of  reward  and  harm  which  leads  people  to
mistakenly apportion credit and blame to the respective recipients.
However, even those who are most prone to the just world fallacy are not able to interpret all
instances of success and failure as being the result of merit or demerit. Lerner and Miller
(1978) offer Lifton’s description of the reactions of Hiroshima survivors as an example. Such
survivors exhibited “a vast breakdown of faith in the larger human matrix supporting each
individual’s life, and therefore a loss of faith or ‘trust in the structure of existence’” (Lifton,
1963, p. 487). In such extreme cases, an explanation in terms of desert is not just implausible,
but entirely unavailable. Short of such extremity, however, the just world fallacy seems to be
robust. While the early literature on the just world fallacy claimed that individuals would act
to prevent injustice when they were able to do so, but would assimilate ostensible injustice as
being just  when they were not,  more recent studies have found that those most prone to
commit the just world fallacy are least likely to take action in cases where they perceive
injustice as they tend to assume that all will be well in the end (Gaucher, Hafer, Kay, &
Davidenko, 2010; Stroebe, 2013). While other recent research has focused on the potential
positive elements of the fallacy (Maes, Tarnai, & Schuster, 2012), such as its connection to
forgiveness (Strelan, 2007), it is what the just world fallacy tells us about our psychological
response  to  unevenly  distributed  rewards,  and  in  particular  the  problematic  nature  of
apportioning credit and blame to the undeserving, that concerns us here.
Why does the existence of the just world fallacy challenge the community thesis in business
ethics? Because it endangers the sense of equal participation that communities require. Such
participation requires us to be able to deliberate together about the good of that community,
and a key part of that deliberation pertains to justice within the community. Unless we are
able to adequately assess whether rewards or punishments are deserved, we will be unable to
follow the basic principles of justice that a community requires. According to research into
the just world fallacy, people are liable to believe that others are due precisely what they are
given, and so what should result from shared deliberation—judgments about who deserves
what and why—in fact precedes and shapes it. Therefore, the just world fallacy seems to be
problematic for any attempt to implement an Aristotelian model of justice, which holds that
each should be rewarded according to merit, within organizations just as within the Polis.
Aristotle argued that “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is
established with a view to some good; for mankind always acts to obtain that which they
think good” (Pol 1252a). However, this pursuit of communal goods seems to be harder to
achieve for unequal groups than we might  have imagined.  Indeed,  the just  world fallacy
suggests  that  it  is  difficult  to  separate  relational  equality, the kind of  equality  of  regard,
discussed in the previous section, needed to sustain Aristotelian communities by facilitating
membership of the community and allowing for meaningful participation, from distributional
equality (i.e., equality with respect to the distribution of goods such as pay and prestige). If
we have an ingrained tendency to regard the successful as possessing merits that warrant that
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success, even when we are partially able to see that such success is a result of luck, then it
will be hard to maintain the relational equality required to deliberate together properly. By
drawing this  distinction,  I  do not mean to suggest that theories  of relational  equality  are
unconcerned with distribution. Distributional equality might be a tool, rather than the end, of
justice, but given this feature of human psychology, it seems to be a tool which is inextricably
related to its end.
Furthermore, given that the just world fallacy also applies to self-evaluations, for instance
Benson and Ritter  (1990) observed a  positive relationship between just  world  belief  and
depression in unemployed subjects, then an unbalanced distribution of goods will, in and of
itself,  be  liable  to  undermine  the  ability  of  the  less  successful  to  challenge  the  more
successful, which is a pre-requisite of shared deliberation within a community.
The self-derogation that seems to result from the just world fallacy makes it impossible for
the  unsuccessful  to  regard  themselves  as  equals  with  their  more  successful  counterparts.
Wade,  O’Reilly,  and  Pollock  (2006)  found  that  CEO  compensation  affects  commitment
within an organization and that excessive CEO compensation increases turnover at  lower
levels of an organization. One possible explanation of this phenomenon, in light of research
into the just  world fallacy, is  that  those who are the worst  off in  a  highly economically
unequal organization are less able to feel as though they are full members of a community,
and so become less able and willing to commit meaningfully to that community.
If the distance between the CEO and other senior officers, and the rank and file becomes too
great, then the prevalence of the just world fallacy indicates that the CEO and the others will
be regarded as deserving of their success whether or not this is so, and renders it less likely
that legitimate criticism of the highly rewarded will be forthcoming. If possession of these
goods is regarded as a reflection of their ability to lead the company, and if even merely
fortunate  gains  are  regarded  as  being  indicative  of  deserving  qualities,  then  significant
inequalities are liable to give rise to an undue deference to the successful. Of course, the just
world  fallacy  also suggests  that  people  are  liable  to  be  unfairly  blamed when things  go
wrong. See Grint (2010) for a discussion of scapegoating of leaders, which is relevant to this
point.
The just world fallacy shows that attributions of qualities that may be deemed to warrant
reward  and  punishment  are  often  mistakenly  based  on  lucky  or  unlucky  outcomes,  and
therefore uneven distributions are liable to be the basis of such mistaken attributions. Unless
we think it possible to eliminate fortune from the processes through which goods and harms
are allocated, this ought to concern us. In the following section, I try to apply this lesson to
contemporary  organizations  by  offering  some  suggestions  about  the  likely  shape  of
Aristotelian community in business organizations.
EGALITARIAN ARISTOTELIAN ORGANIZATIONS
Koehn (1998) has criticized virtue ethics on the grounds that it
fails  to  acknowledge  the  possibility  that  generally  accepted  practices  or  procedures  may
themselves be suspect and that the agent may need to make a radical change in his or her
thought in order to be able to do the right thing. (p. 510)
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This seems to be a well-founded misgiving, for the most part, though there are many varieties
of virtue ethics which avoid this mistake. In this section, I draw on a more radical strand in
Aristotelianism, and use it to explore what organizations would need to be like to satisfy the
criteria of an Aristotelian community.
While  Aristotle  was  aware  that  excessive  inequality  was  liable  to  create  an  unhelpful
factionalism which  hindered  politics  (Pol  1304a),  he  is  probably  best  characterized  as  a
political conservative (Mulgan, 2000). Solomon’s own brand of Aristotelian business ethics is
at the conservative end of the spectrum too. He suggests that “the virtues . . . do not involve
radical  demands on our behaviour” and that  such a  suggestion “is  completely foreign to
Aristotle’s insistence on ‘moderation’” (1993, p. 203). We may wonder whether counseling
moderation in a social milieu in which excess has become the norm, one in which pleonexia
is often seen as a duty (MacIntyre, 2016, p. 127), would count as a “radical demand,” but in
any case, given the frequency of corporate scandals, we may be inclined to be somewhat
more  skeptical  than  Solomon  about  the  ethical  quality  of  contemporary  business.  That
Solomon’s article “Business with Virtue? Maybe Next Year” was published in 2000, the year
before the WorldCom and Enron scandals, should serve as an ironic reminder that business
ethicists have been prone to be more optimistic than the reality of ethics in business has
warranted. Indeed, to counsel moderation where radical challenge is called for suggests they
may even be prone to overestimate how just the world is.
There is scope for a more egalitarian version of Aristotle’s community thesis which would be
less threatened by the just world fallacy but would require us to radically change business
organizations  (a  claim  not  unknown  in  the  virtue  ethics  literature,  see,  for  example,
McPherson,  2013).  Solomon  himself  admits  that  as  jobs  become  ever  more  insecure,
“contingency plans take the place of what once was called loyalty. Nothing is left to trust”
(1994, p. 273). The Aristotelian political community has the good of its citizens as its primary
aim, but this is not and cannot be true for the contemporary firm, which must have profit as
one of its central aims, if not its defining aim. As Morrell (2012) puts it, for Aristotle “the
common good rests ultimately on notions of justice in society rather than on profit in the
firm” (p. 47).
According to MacIntyre, perhaps the foremost “revolutionary” virtue ethicist (see MacIntyre,
2008), free market economies
ruthlessly impose market conditions that forcibly deprive many workers of productive work,
that  condemn parts  of  the labor force in metropolitan countries and whole societies in less
developed areas to irremediable economic deprivation, that enlarge inequalities and divisions of
wealth  and  income,  so  organizing  societies  into  competing  and  antagonistic  interests.
(MacIntyre, 1998, p. 249)
Such a climate is hardly conducive to the emergence of Aristotelian communities. Indeed, this
antagonism  must  be  tackled  to  establish  such  communities.  However,  creating  an
organization  characterized  by  the  relationships  and  participation  required  by  Aristotelian
communities is not easy to achieve.
Relational  equality  is  a  distinctive  feature  of  workplaces  likely  to  give  rise  to  genuine
community, not a single policy that can be implemented. So, rather than offer a—for now
perhaps—impossible imperative (“ensure your organization is egalitarian!”), we might, in a
less utopian vein, offer simpler suggestions. To that end, I propose four related characteristics
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which might enable us to recognize organizations conducive to the emergence of genuine
communities: a suspicion of inequality, minimal displays of unequal power, an emphasis on
face-to-face interaction, and relatively equal pay. The first describes a complex habit of mind
and character, and so is not to be regarded as a practical recommendation, per se, whereas the
others may be actively pursued by organizations, even if they are perhaps better understood
as  signifiers  of  community. These  are  tentative  suggestions  based  on my reading  of  the
concept of Aristotelian community, and my intention here is to start a conversation on what
the just world fallacy entails for our social relationships within organizations and outside of
experimental setting, rather than to offer the final word on the matter.3
Suspicion of Inequality
Inequality of wealth and power may be understood in a variety of ways. It may be viewed as
natural, or as warranted given the differences in merit between people, or it may be viewed as
bizarre  and  at  least  prima  facie  requiring  special  justification.  Those  who start  with  the
presumption that the world is unjust are likely to be relatively immune to the just world
fallacy. Part of the appeal of a revolutionary Aristotelianism (i.e., one that takes Marxism and
its key insights seriously) is that it enables us to understand the “re-enforcements” which lead
to unjust outcomes as being anything but random, but instead as being consequences of an
unjust system. The re-enforcements are then regarded as being explicable, which lessens the
psychological pressure to grope around for an explanation pertaining to individual merit or
demerit. While the concept of “virtuous mean” seems to be inherently moderate, sometimes
the virtuous mean between extremes of excess and deficiency calls for radical action. Once
upon a time, to believe in democracy was to be a revolutionary.
Awareness of bias does not eliminate it.  West, Meserve, and Stanovich (2012) found that
cognitive sophistication does not prevent us from being blind to our own cognitive biases,
and even being aware of such biases does not help us to avoid the classic reasoning errors
documented in, for instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1975). However, I offer a tentative
hypothesis: The more readily people identify cases of inequality as “extreme cases,” the less
prone they will be to commit the just world fallacy. If we suspect the world to be unjust
because of a presumption of the justice of equality, a presumption which can be intellectually
motivated rather than merely intuitive, and therefore more readily identify inequality as being
“extreme,” then committing the just world fallacy becomes less likely. If this is correct, then
we  would  do  well  to  retain  some  of  the  suspicion  Aristotle  would  have  had  about
contemporary capitalism, even as we reject his own preference for inegalitarian politics.
Few Displays of Unequal Power
Managers,  directors,  and  other  parties  charged  with  designing  organizational  policy  and
governance measures should make efforts to minimize displays of unequal power, wealth, or
3 Another feature of organizations which fulfill the criteria of Aristotelian communities is that they pursue some
good end. Much has been written about this elsewhere (e.g., Moore, 2012a, 2017; Moore & Beadle, 2006), and
so I  will  not  discuss  it  here other  than to  note that  I  share the view that  pursuing a good end  is  another
characteristic feature. In any case, in the present article I am more interested in preconditions of sustaining
human relationships within the community.
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other rewards. The aim here would be to eliminate perceived distance between the most and
least  powerful  within an organization,  to  facilitate  the discussion and shared  deliberation
required by communities. If inequalities in power or receipt of reward are not present, then it
will not be possible for someone to commit the just world fallacy, which would facilitate the
emergence of genuine community. Indeed, even where there are differences in power, which
may be inevitable, a democratic spirit, in which power and authority are not appealed to, and
are not actively on display, would be a way of fostering community. The suggestion offered
here has some affinity with Landemore and Ferreras’ (2016) defense of workplace democracy
and may find support from empirical studies which associate psychosocial wellbeing with the
most democratic workplaces (see, for example, Knudsen, Busck, & Lind, 2011). It also has
an affinity  with conceptions  of  management  and leadership which focus on the needs  of
employees, rather than the characteristics of leaders and managers themselves, in particular
Servant Leadership (Greenleaf, 2002; Sinnicks, 2018).
An Emphasis on Face-to-Face Interaction
One notable feature of documented instances of experimental participants committing the just
world fallacy is the relative paucity of information they have access to regarding the subjects
they judge deserving of  some good or  ill.  The  studies  focus  on judgments  pertaining  to
strangers where the only relevant information available is their receipt of some benefit or
harm, and it seems unlikely we would make such erroneous judgments about people we know
well. Fostering close-knit working groups is likely to reduce the psychological pressure to
commit  the just  world fallacy when confronted with unequal distributions of some good.
Friendship, or some degree of warm association, is likely to prevent the self-evaluation of the
less successful from ruling out participation in shared-deliberation. This contrasts with the
impersonal nature of many large firms. Dobson (2008) claims that “the modern firm is simply
creating different types of community: more fluid, more all-embracing, more virtual, and no
less  virtuous”  (p.  73).  On the  topic  of  virtual  communities,  Dobson suggests  that  social
networking  Internet  sites  are  “all  about  building  communities.  Furthermore,  these  new
communities  are  far  more  dynamic,  all-embracing  and  geographically  diverse”  (Dobson,
2008, p. 73). However, someone might be able to identify a common good with the members
of their department, that is, people with whom they have daily face-to-face contact, but it is
harder to imagine this relationship obtaining between people whose only contact is via email,
let alone people with whom they do not interact at all. Therefore, it is hard to believe that the
geographical diversity or virtual interactions common within contemporary organizations will
facilitate  a  genuinely  Aristotelian  community. These  considerations  may  also  be  used  to
suggest that smaller organizations may be more likely to give rise to community, a point
emphasized by MacIntyre (1999). This suspicion is also supported by research into optimal
community  size  (Dunbar  &  Sosis,  2018),  including  the  optimal  size  and  structure  of
organizations  (Dunbar,  2014),  which  recommend  small  groupings  in  which  face-to-face
interactions are common, and thus make closer personal relationships within the organization
more likely.
Relatively Equal Pay
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This may be a predictable item, but it is one to which my analysis of the just world fallacy, if
correct, grants new argumentative impetus. Where goods are distributed reasonably equally,
there is no scope for people to commit the just world fallacy, resulting as it does from a
psychological  response  to  unevenly  distributed  rewards  or  harms.  This  is  not  a  decisive
argument for  equality  because other  considerations  may carry more  weight,  but  it  is  not
unimportant. Inequalities of income and wealth have increased over recent decades (Piketty,
2014;  Stiglitz,  2012),  and  there  is  evidence  that  this  inequality  is  both  harmful  to  the
economy (Lansley, 2012) and generally corrodes trust in society (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).
The just world fallacy simply adds weight to arguments against inequality when we can take
it as a premise that the cultivation of community is a choice-worthy end. This is because,
while relational and distributional equality are distinct concepts, the just world fallacy gives
us  reason—one  reason  among  others—to  think  they  are  closely  related.  Therefore,  one
recommendation we might  offer, though one which may require the powerful  to perform
virtuous actions unhappily, is to seek to create more distributively equal workplaces.
Aristotelian business ethicists (such as Moore, 2012b) may endorse Drucker’s (1977, 1984)
claim that there should be some limit  to the ratio between the pay of CEOs and average
employee pay, Drucker’s own suggestions were in the 20:1 to 25:1 range, even though they
do not tend to be egalitarians about income and wealth. However, while the just world fallacy
may  suggest  that  inequalities  in  pay  are  justified  if  and  only  if  they  genuinely  reflect
differences  in  desert,  even  then  they  may undermine  the  sense  of  community  within  an
organization.  This is because the predisposition to regard the rewarded as deserving their
reward can foreclose the possibility of communal deliberation. It is worth noting that because
the outcomes themselves are used as a heuristic for attributing merit or fault to others, even
nonfortuitous  rewards  may be  corrosive  of  community  because  derogation  of  those  who
deserve fewer rewards or to be harmed, for instance, may still blind us to the contribution
they can make to a community. This point is exacerbated by the self-derogation that occurs
when individuals have suffered some harm, as documented by Benson and Ritter’s (1990)
research into unemployed subjects, referenced above. As such, we can see just how difficult it
is to foster just and genuine communities within business organizations.
While more research may be needed if we are to ascertain precisely what levels of unequal
reward may be detrimental to reasoned judgments about personal attributes, and by extension
the relational equality required for community, the fortuitous reward in Lerner’s original 1965
study was US$3.50 for a 15-min task (adjusted for inflation worth approx. US$27 today).
This is a sign that even small differences in receipt of external goods, when it is the only
thing we know about someone, can be extremely powerful.
CONCLUSION
When confronted with the question “does the modern large corporation fulfill the criteria of a
community?” the Aristotelian response is “it can and should,” but this prescription should be
understood as  being more  radical  than  is  typically  the case.  Indeed,  if  for  Hartman it  is
possible but not probable for business organizations to be communities, our conclusion might
be that it is conceivable but enormously difficult to achieve. The just world fallacy reveals
that  the  mutual  respect,  care,  and  compassion  which  Solomon  held  to  be  definitive  of
corporations-as-communities are harder to achieve than is typically assumed. While there is a
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definite  conceptual  distinction  between  the  normative  and  descriptive  senses  of  the
community thesis,  in reality there is  less distance than this  distinction might  suggest.  As
MacIntyre  (2007)  has  noted,  all  moralities  presuppose  a  sociology:  Every  ethical  system
presupposes some picture of social relations and its corollary social ontology. MacIntyre’s
point may be read as a contemporary Aristotelian equivalent of the Kantian dictum “ought
implies can.” With this in mind, I urge those who see value in shaping business organizations
so that they approximate, as closely as is feasible, Aristotelian communities to consider the
four characteristics I outline above—a suspicion of inequality, few displays of unequal power,
an  emphasis  on  face-to-face  interaction,  and  relatively  equal  pay—as  possible  tools  for
making such communities possible, and thus making the normative claim at the heart of the
community thesis more than a merely abstract and aspirational imperative.
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